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Facts
The matter came to the Constitutional Court by referral from the High Court. The Applicant applied for
leave to issue judicial review process and leave was granted by the High Court. While the main
application for judicial review was still pending, the Respondent filed an application to discharge the
leave granted to the Applicant. The Applicant opposed this motion and then applied to have the matter
referred to the Constitutional Court for the determination of the following questions:
1. Whether in light of the provisions of Article 118 of the Constitution, judicial review
proceedings are still subject to grant of leave; and
2. Whether in light of Article 118 of the Constitution, leave to commence judicial review
proceedings granted prior to 5 January 2016 can be discharged.
Holding
1. The requirement to first obtain leave before one can institute judicial review proceedings is an
important tool by which the court is able to prevent the impediment of the smooth running of
government institutions as well as the halting unnecessarily of government policies and
decisions that can result from having to hear and determine frivolous and vexatious cases. The
leave stage enables the court to stop the influx into the court system of unmeritorious cases that
would assume the courts resources only to be dismissed later on the ground that they are
frivolous or vexatious.
2. The phrase ‘undue regard to technicalities’ means placing reliance on or giving heed to a minor
detail or point of law which is part of a broader set of rules that govern the manner in which
court proceedings are to be conducted which does not go to the core of the whole court process.
3. Article 118(2)(e) of the Constitution does not proscribe adherence to procedural rules or
technicalities as what it proscribes is paying undue regard to procedural technicalities that result
in a manifest injustice. Article 118(2)(e) does not proscribe the requirement for leave before
issuing judicial review process in judicial review matters. The requirement to first obtain leave
of the court before issuing judicial review process still subsists and it does not violate the
provisions of Articles 118(2)(e) and 134 of the Constitution.
Significance
For ease of reference, Article 118(2)(e) requires the Courts, in the exercise of judicial authority, to be
guided by the principle that ‘justice shall be administered without undue regard to procedural
technicalities.’ The decision of the Constitutional Court is problematic on many fronts. The Court took
the view that the requirement for obtaining leave prior to issuing judicial review process is both a
procedural and substantive rule. According to the Court, this is because the leave requirement can be
dispositive of a judicial review matter. In the words of the Court:
For the foregoing, it is clear that the requirement to first obtain leave before one can institute
judicial review proceedings is an important tool by which the court is able to prevent the
impediment of the smooth functioning of government institutions as well as the halting
unnecessarily of government policies and decisions that can result from having to hear and
determine frivolous and vexatious cases. The leave stage also enables the Court to stop the
influx into the Court system of unmeritorious cases that would consume the Court’s resources
only to be dismissed later on grounds that they are frivolous or vexatious.
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The import of this holding is that if a technical rule or procedure is capable of disposing a matter then
it does not offend Article 118(2)(e) of the Constitution. However, to hold this way is a misdirection on
the part of the Court. It is a position that shows very little appreciation of the historical roots of Article
118(2)(e) and an example of constitutional adjudication that is ‘outcomes-based decision-making’ 1 as
opposed to principled adjudication. Article 118(2)(e) of the Zambian Constitution was transplanted
verbatim from Article 159(2)(d) of the Kenyan Constitution of 2010. Its inclusion in the Kenyan
Constitution was actuated largely by the fact that prior to 2010, no single presidential election petition
was ever head on merits in Kenya. They were all systematically killed off by the courts on procedural
technicalities. A few case examples could illustrate this problem. Mwai Kibaki vs. Daniel Toroitichi
Arap Moi Court of Appeal Civil Application No. 172 [Election Petition No.1of 1998] was a presidential
election petition brought by then main opposition candidate Mwai Kibaki against the election of
President Daniel Arap Moi, following Kenya’s 1997 elections. Mwai brought an action to void the
election for several electoral malpractices violating electoral rules. The petition, however, was thrown
out on procedural technicalities to do with the service of the petition.
The petitioner had served the petition by way of publication in the government Gazette, since the
respondent had not furnished details of his advocates as provided for in the rule. The petitioner did not
effect personal or direct service as required by the relevant rules because the respondent, as president
‘is surrounded by a massive ring of security which is not possible to penetrate.’ 2 The court held that the
rule did not compel the respondent to provide contact details of his advocates. According to the court,
service through publication in Gazette would only apply if the option of personal service, service
through advocates and/or registered mail had been attempted and failed. Only then could a petition be
presented by way of publication in the Gazette, and because this was not done, then the petition failed
and the court dismissed it for improper service. 3
In the Kenyan context, this was not an isolated incident but was a systematic way the judiciary took to
killing off presidential election petitions without hearing the merits. For example, following the 1992
presidential elections, losing opposition candidate, Kenneth Matiba brought a petition challenging the
election of Daniel Arap Moi. 4 However, before the election, Matiba became physically incapacitated
and unable even to write, and, therefore, unable to personally sign the election petition as required by
the rules of service. The petition was signed by his wife, who he had given power of attorney. The court,
however, struck the petition for failure to sign the petition personally by the petitioner. 5
What is clear from these cases is that adherence to existing procedures were dispositive of the cases.
Yet that was problematic, as the merits of the cases were never weighed. The 2010 Constitution,
therefore, deliberately included Article 159(2)(d) to overcome that. It is not about how useful or
dispositive a procedural rule is. To hold, as did the Constitutional Court, that a procedure that is
dispositive of a case is consistent with Article 118(2)(e) is to miss the substance of the provision.
As already noted, the decision is outcome based as opposed to principled adjudication. Under outcome
based adjudication, the court thinks of the possible consequences of its decision and if it does not like
the consequences, it decides the case before it in a manner consistent with an outcome it prefers.6 It is
an approach that is based on ‘suppositions, conjecture or convenient assumptions.’ 7 In arriving at the
decision to sustain the rule requiring leave, the Constitutional Court based its decision not on the
articulation of the principles underlying Article 118 but on the filtering function of the rule and its
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capacity to dispose of unmeritorious claims in applications for judicial review. This outcome is not
based on the reading or analysis of Article 118(2)(e) as this Article does not save a procedural rule
merely on account of its supposed utilitarian value. It is hard to actually think of a procedural rule that
would not meet the utility or dispositive value criteria set by the Constitutional Court in this case.
On the other hand, principled adjudication is grounded in the neutrality and generality of the reasons of
the decision marker. Herbert Wechsler correctly described what constitutes principled adjudication:
A principled decision, in the sense I have in mind, is one that rests on reasons with respect to
all the issues in the case, reasons that in their generality and their neutrality transcend any
immediate result that is involved. 8
In principled adjudication, it is not the role of the Court to worry about the likely consequences of their
decision to government institutions, provided their decision is well reasoned and wells-up from correct
interpretation of constitutional principles. In focusing on the supposed utility of the leave rule, the
Constitutional Court failed to transcend the particularities of the case before it in order to articulate a
broad framework that would inform litigants in advance when a particular rule of procedure would
offend Article 118(2)(e) of the Constitution. Serving a procedural rule on account of its supposed utility
value is to say nothing of value as every procedural rule was created for a purpose.
The Constitutional Court further held that the rule requiring leave before issuing judicial review process
is both procedural and substantive, and is, therefore, ‘part and parcel’ of the application for judicial
review. The Court seemed to think that judicial review is inconceivable without the rule requiring leave
of Court. Shockingly, the Court went further to assert that because of the filtering function the leave
rule plays, it is ‘not tenable at law’ to have it nullified (or perhaps even modified). This is incorrect and
demonstrates limited appreciation of the plenitude of the practice of judicial review across the common
law world. Judicial review is not dependent on the leave requirement. There is no necessary connection
between the two. Several common law jurisdictions allow judicial review applications without requiring
prior permission of the Court to proceed. For example, there is no leave requirement for judicial review
proceedings in Canada, New Zealand, Australia, and Scotland. 9 It is, therefore, completely misleading
to hold that the requirement for leave is ‘part and parcel’ of judicial review. Even under English law,
from which the rule was inherited, the rule around leave is more nuanced and does not apply, for
example, to statutory judicial review which imposes six-week time limits. 10
It would appear that the Constitutional Court believes it is the duty of the judiciary to limit scrutiny of
the government by its own citizens through judicial review. To the Constitutional Court, the rule for
obtaining leave is necessary in order to ‘prevent the impediment of the smooth functioning of
government institutions.’ What about the doctrine of equality before the law? The authors Wade and
Forsyth have stated that ‘it seems wrong to impose this requirement in proceedings against public
authorities, who ought not to be treated more favourably than other litigants.’ 11 There is something
fundamentally wrong about affording the government institutions this filter which is not available to
every other litigant. As the Australian Administrative Review Council stated, ‘it is difficult to justify a
leave requirement in public law cases when no such requirement exists in other civil litigation.’ 12 The
Council took the view that the leave requirement adds to the expense and complexity of litigation to the
disadvantage of applicants with legitimate causes of action.13
The decision of the Constitutional Court, in shielding the government institutions, elevates the
government above the governed, an outcome that offends the concept of the rule of law, which at its
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barest minimum, requires that the governors and the governed to be subject to the same rules. 14 The
Court should not have the duty to act as a gate keeper on behalf of government against its own citizens
nor a supplicant on behalf of public authorities. The mandate of the judiciary in Article 118(1) of the
constitution is simply to administer judicial authority in a just manner that promotes accountability.
That is all.
The case demonstrates the inability of the Constitutional Court to transcend insular jurisprudence that
promotes a culture of subservience to the executive. It demonstrates reluctance on the part of the Court
to articulate ground breaking, innovative and progressive jurisprudence that does not see the
government as elevated above its people but as a servant of the people and entirely answerable to the
people, no matter how unwarranted the questions the people may ask. This has been a general problem
affecting many judiciaries in Africa. Prempeh aptly described this problem when he stated:
The result, in the African context, is what I have called a ‘jurisprudence of executive
supremacy’- a jurisprudence that is unduly deferential to executive power, and, at best sceptical
of ‘novel’ claims rooted in modern conceptions of constitutionalism. 15
This case presented the Constitutional Court an opportunity to articulate clear principles underlying the
adoption of Article 118 and enable litigants in advance how their claims will be settled in relation to
the provision. It was an opportunity to break ground for a new jurisprudence that articulates the new
Constitutional norms in the amended Constitution. Sadly, the opportunity was squandered.

14

Stu Woolman, ‘Understanding South Africa’s Aspirational Constitution as Scaffolding’ (2015/2016) 60 New
York Law School Law Review 286
15
H Kwasi Prempeh, ‘Presidential Power in Comparative Perspective: The Puzzling Persistence of Imperial
Presidency in Post-Authoritarian Africa’ (2008) 35 Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly 829

23

